This paper painstakingly restores a vintage empirical model of unemployment determination by interacting shocks and institutions, and runs it on recent data featuring dramatic shocks and controversial institutional change. Theoretical insights and empirical results suggest that reforms and capital ‡ows contribute sensible and interrelated explanations for the recent twists and turns of unemployment rates in Europe and elsewhere.
Introduction
Unemployment is a vast issue that this paper approaches from a particular perspective. Figure   1 displays unemployment rate paths over 5-year periods since 1960 for the countries in the sample studied by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000, henceforth BW) . To improve legibility three panels plot the data separately and on di¤erent scales for current euro area countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain) , other European countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom), and non-European countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, United States). BW's regressions could only analyze the …rst half or so of the currently available time span. In that sample, unemployment rates trended upwards in European (especially Continental) countries, but moved cyclically along fairly stable and ultimately lower levels in other (especially "Anglo-Saxon") countries. BW …rst assessed the empirical …t of a model that confronts institutionally di¤erent countries with common shocks, then explored the empirical relevance of three country-speci…c macroeconomic shock series and of their interactions with labor market institutions. This paper revisits the BW empirical approach and applies it to recent data featuring controversial labor market reforms and uncommon (unprecedented, and with di¤erent implications for di¤erent countries) macroeconomic events. At just about the time when BW was being written the data began to look di¤erent. The previous high persistence or even hysteresis (Blanchard and Summers, 1986) of unemployment came to an end in Europe. Unemployment rates began to decline and converge during the run up to and early phases of Economic and Monetary Union, then surged and diverged as the Great Recession and the European debt crisis hit. These new data provide a useful testing ground for BW's insights as well as for those of Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel (2005) , Bertola, Blau, and Kahn (2002) , and of the many other papers that extend and …nesse its approach: even the dataset analyzed by Bassanini and Duval (2006) , perhaps the most accomplished empirical exercise of this type, stops in 2003.
The empirical exercise also o¤ers an opportunity to appreciate and discuss conceptual and methodological aspects of BW, of the related work in Blanchard (1997 Blanchard ( , 2006 and in those papers'references, and more generally of macro-level, policy-oriented empirical work on labor market institutions and outcomes. Country panel regressions are not as fashionable as they used to be.
Because plausibly relevant variables and mechanisms are much more numerous than available obser- Unemployment rate, AMECO 1 9 6 0 -1 9 6 4 1 9 6 5 -1 9 6 9 1 9 7 0 -1 9 7 4 1 9 7 5 -1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 -1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 -1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 -1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 -2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 -2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 -2 0 1 4 2 0 1 5 -Denmark Norway Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom 0 .02 .04 .06 .08 .1 Unemployment rate, AMECO 1 9 6 0 -1 9 6 4 1 9 6 5 -1 9 6 9 1 9 7 0 -1 9 7 4 1 9 7 5 -1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 -1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 -1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 -1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 -2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 -2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 -2 0 1 4 2 0 1 5 -Australia Canada Japan New Zealand United States 0 .02 .04 .06 .08 .1 Unemployment rate, AMECO 1 9 6 0 -1 9 6 4 1 9 6 5 -1 9 6 9 1 9 7 0 -1 9 7 4 1 9 7 5 -1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 -1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 -1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 -1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 -2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 -2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 -2 0 1 4 2 0 1 5 -Unemployment rate, AMECO vations, empirical models that seek aggregate evidence unavoidably oversimplify reality, and results can be confusing and misleading (Baccaro and Rei, 2007) . As discussed in BW, the statistical signi…cance of interesting coe¢ cients is sometimes driven by inclusion or omission of a single country's observations, and variable de…nitions and regression speci…cation choices can be suspicious just because the results con…rm the authors'theoretical priors. Empirical work on limited data cannot on its own provide robust insights. But regressions, like paintings, can portray reality in an interesting way, and crisply outline sensible theoretical mechanisms. The BW empirical approach established that institutions do not su¢ ce to explain unemployment experiences. The present paper suggests that a next step, focused on the international spillovers triggered by …nancial integration, may help interpret sharp unemployment swings within Europe, and shed some light on the determinants of the institutions that in turn determine unemployment.
Section 2 updates the original BW regressions. The exercise …nds that a "shocks and institutions" approach still distills clear and intriguing messages from the extended country panel, but …ts recent evidence less precisely and much less intuitively than the original sample. Section 3 revisits the theoretical underpinnings of the BW regressions and, extending the work of an earlier paper (Bertola, 2016) , outlines the role of international capital mobility as a source of labor market shocks and a determinant of labor market institutions. Aiming to characterize the strengths and shortcomings of the BW approach, Section 4 obtains preliminary relevant evidence from the updated sample. Section 5 concludes with a brief summary and discussion of policy implications.
Restoration and update
In the following expressions U ct is the unemployment rate in country c and period t. Explanatory variables I ict and S jct are institutions (indexed by i) and shocks (indexed by j) in country c and period t. All are measured as deviations from their mean within each regression's sample, which is a slightly unbalanced panel if data are not available (see the Data Appendix for a discussion of de…nitions and sources, and plots displaying available observations by variable, country, and period).
The regressions may also include country …xed e¤ects c c and period …xed e¤ects t t . Table 1 estimates a regression that explains unemployment rates with period dummies, allowing this time e¤ect to depend on time-invariant institutional characteristics of each country and country …xed e¤ects:
Institutions and time
The …rst column replicates BW. The regression asks the data whether institutions matter di¤erently at di¤erent times. This was a natural question when observing unemployment fanning out between the 1970s and the 1990s. The answer is that observable institutional characteristics do signi…cantly in ‡uence the amplitude of unemployment's variation over time. Institutions are measured in a way 1 The Stata syntax for this equation is $DEPV = ( {i:$INST } )*( {tef:_Iperiod_*} ) + {tef:_Iperiod_*} + {c:_Icn_*} where $DEPV contains the name of the relevant unemployment series and $INST lists the relevant institutional variables. that implies positive interaction coe¢ cients if generous unemployment insurance, strong employment protection, large tax wedges, and pervasive unionization increase the persistence of unemployment through cycles that would generate unemployment ‡uctuations in less regulated economies, while active labor market policies and wage-setting coordination (both taken with negative sign) reduce unemployment persistence. The BW sample's data conform to expectations in that most interaction e¤ects are signi…cantly larger than zero.
The second column uses all currently available unemployment rates (shown in Figure 1 ). The sample includes one-and-a-half as many 5-year periods (the …rst, "1960-1964", and last, "2015-" are averages of fewer than 5 observations) for the 20 countries considered in BW; …ve degrees of freedom are consumed by the new period e¤ects. Not surprisingly, some of the institutional indicators measured in the late 1980s and early 1990s lose signi…cance. One is active labor market policy, which in BW's data (drawn from Nickell, 1997) was measured in a rather elaborate way that would be di¢ cult to update and may be particularly subject to the data-mining suspicions voiced by BW. The other two are the tax wedge and union density, which updated series (see the Data Appendix) …nd to have changed rather di¤erently in di¤erent countries. Other indicators do remain signi…cantly related to unemployment variation even as it ceases to trend upwards in column 2, which runs the regression on the complete updated sample, and column 3, which uses only its more recent portion. Table 2 relate unemployment levels to time-invariant institutions rather than unrestricted country dummies,
The regressions in
As in the original BW sample used in column 1, so in the updated and more recent samples of columns 2 and 3 the interaction coe¢ cients are somewhat weaker than those estimated in Table 1 . Table 3 reports interaction coe¢ cient estimates from the nonlinear regression
which lets period e¤ects interact with time-varying indicators of country-speci…c labor market institutions. The results were not particularly strong in the original BW regressions replicated in columns 1 and 2. The remaining columns of the Table run the regression on the complete current sample, using some time-invariant BW institutional indicators and updated indicators of unemployment in-2 In Stata, $DEPV = ({i:$INSTtv})*({tef:_Iperiod_*}) + {tef:_Iperiod_*} + {c:_Icn_*} . 
Institutions and shocks
Consider next the role in the more recent period of the country-speci…c labor market shocks de…ned by BW, and updated here as discussed in detail by the Data Appendix. These are the rate of total factor productivity (TFP) growth, which is negatively associated with unemployment if real wages fail to adjust to it, and measured with a negative sign to imply a positive expected coe¢ cient; the real interest rate, which through capital accumulation is expected to reduce employment at given wage and productivity; and a dynamically adjusted log labor share which, under conditions discussed in Blanchard (1997) and in Section 3 below, can capture the unemployment implications of temporarily misaligned real wages. .06
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Real rate, mix LD shock, mix 1 9 6 0 -1 9 6 4 1 9 6 5 -1 9 6 9 1 9 7 0 -1 9 7 4 1 9 7 5 -1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 -1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 -1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 -1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 - LD shock, mix 1 9 6 0 -1 9 6 4 1 9 6 5 -1 9 6 9 1 9 7 0 -1 9 7 4 1 9 7 5 -1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 -1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 -1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 -1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 - to the great recession and in its aftermath. The real rate, after a strong increase in the 1980s, declines sharply from the mid 1990s to the current "secular stagnation" phase, on time paths that are very similar across countries. The labor demand shock turns positive in European countries only after the end of the BW sample, and continues its previous upward trend in the control group of non-European countries. Table 4 reports the slope coe¢ cients of a linear regression of unemployment on these shocks, country …xed e¤ects, and a P ct dummy that equals unity only in Portugal for the period, coinciding with the country's revolution, when for that country the OECD Business Sector Database labor share data behave in a very peculiar way:
The behavior of shocks is su¢ ciently diverse to disentangle their separate contributions to unemployment variation. All three have positive coe¢ cients in column 1, which uses the original BW data and sample. The coe¢ cients are still positive and signi…cant in column 2, which uses the updated data set. Shockingly, however, the coe¢ cient of TFP growth has the wrong sign when in column 3 the early portion of the sample is dropped. Table 5 reports the shock and institution coe¢ cients of a regression that allows institutions to 
The …t is very good in the original BW results of column 1, and not much worse in the updated extended sample of column 2 and in the recent sample of column 3. As shown in Figure 3 , this empirical relationship …ts well not only unemployment increases between the 1970s and the 1990s, but also the heterogenous and asymmetric developments of the following decades, when European countries took turns in leading unemployment swings. In the recent past, however, the …t and predictive power of these regressions is mostly due to shocks, insigni…cantly shaped by time-invariant institutions, and relies on a strangely signed TFP growth coe¢ cient. Table 5 column 1 (top left panel), Table 5 column 2 (top right panel), and Table 5 column 3 (bottom panels).
Australia
The perverse association between unemployment and TFP growth in the periods when the latter did not simply trend downwards, but began to ‡uctuate and diverge, suggests that the BW empirical approach does not appropriately account for something that has become important only since the 1990s. One potentially relevant source of variation may be labor market reforms. Following BW, Table 6 inserts time-varying institutional indicators in regression (5). The results do not add much to previous ones. In the BW regressions replicated in columns 1 and 2 most interaction e¤ects are insigni…cant and hard to interpret, and they remain so when using the complete updated sample in column 3. Results for the most recent sample are not reported, and even weaker and harder to interpret: the overall …t is similar to that of the time-invariant institutions regressions of Table 5 , and the shock coe¢ cients are not positive. Table 6 ( 
Some theory
The results of the previous section's restoration and update exercise con…rm the original BW insights but qualify them, in that some new phenomena appear to be beyond reach of that paper's empirical approach. This is useful food for thought. What follows o¤ers three thoughts that may help understand why the BW approach worked well on that paper's sample, and how it may be adapted to interpret new evidence. 
Intentional unemployment
Let each country's per capita production depend on employment l with functional form y(l) = (al)
1
. Labor's marginal productivity,
equals the wage w when employment is on a static competitive labor demand schedule.
As discussed below and in Blanchard (1997) it can be useful to relax the constant-elasticity assumption, which however is very convenient also on the supply side of the labor market. Supposing that the opportunity cost of employment l has the constant-elasticity functional form (l) 1+ = (1 + ), without considering explicitly the age, gender, and skill composition of the population and of the labor force, makes it simple to study the implications of another dimension of heterogeneity.
Let individuals draw di¤erent portions of income from labor and other factors of production, and let market institutions be chosen so as to maximize the welfare of an individual who earns the per-capita labor income, wl = (1 ) y, and a proportion x 6 = 1 of the economy's other per capita income, y. Average employment l increases that individual's income by (x + 1 ) y 0 (l), and equating this to employment's marginal opportunity cost l yields the optimality condition
The wage is on the labor supply schedule w = l if x = 1: for an average representative individual, welfare is maximized at zero unemployment. Just like unions that disregarding employers' pro…ts maximize the wage bill, however, so individuals who earn only a portion of the economy's non-labor income …nd it optimal to decrease employment. 5 If x < 1 (the political majority is less wealthy than average), condition (7) drives a proportional wedge between the market wage and the non-market value of time and, as shown in Figure 4 , reduces employment below the market-clearing level.
The median voter is capital-poorer than the average individual if wealth is more unequally distributed than labor income. In democratic countries, individuals who earn less than the average non-labor income do support employment taxes and non-employment subsidies, legal or collectively bargained minimum wages, limits on weekly work hours, minimum annual holidays, and age-related employability rules (Bertola, 2016) . All of these policies and institutions reduce employment below the laissez-faire level. Some are measured by the BW institutional indicators, and imply unemploy-
when they prevent wages from falling to the market-clearing level in order to maximize the welfare of a decisive individual who earns a fraction x < 1 of average non-labor income.
This simple expression clearly oversimpli…es a reality where there is frictional unemployment even in laissez faire, and labor market institutions also address incomplete information and risk issues. It does show that unemployment, while involuntary at the individual level, at the politicoeconomic level that determines institutions can be an intentional side e¤ect of policies meant to bene…t relatively poor individuals. The model's simple index x of decisive political coalitions'labor orientation determines the extent to which each country's institutions target objectives that favor 5 Empirical analysis of employment rates would need to account for educational policies and demographics (Bertola, Blau, and Kahn, 2007) . These are also theoretically and empirically relevant for unemployment (Bertola, Blau, and Kahn 2002) , but at a level of detail that is beyond the present paper's scope.
6 Inserting (6) in (7) establishes that when x 6 = 1 the log level of optimal employment is lower by (1 x) = ( + ) relative to the laissez faire zero unemployment level. The log wage islower employment. It is in turn determined by the distribution of political decision power, and by …nancial market imperfections and histories of shocks that it would be too ambitious to try and model here.
The politico-economic mechanism underlying (8) may help interpret country-level relationships between unemployment and the institutions that are empirically related to it. In its simplicity, however, that expression illustrates how complicated it can be to interpret the empirical variation of unemployment. Its intentional component may re ‡ect di¤erent values of the decisive agent's labor intensity and political power (x in the model), or of the elasticities ( and ) that shape the welfare implications of employment. Depending on administrative traditions, employment may be shaped by contributions and subsidies that leave measured unemployment constant, rather than by wage-setting constraints.
In empirical work, all this might be constant over time and absorbed by the country …xed e¤ects included in the BW regressions. But variation over time of a country's institutions, driven by political and structural forces, in ‡uences unemployment directly and not just through interactions with period e¤ects or observable shocks. The exclusion of institutional main e¤ects from the regressions reported in Tables 3 and 6 was appropriate when trying to interpret di¤erent unemployment dynamics in countries with stable institutions and similar exposure to largely common shocks. The stronger time variation of institutions since the 1990s, when reforms began to be discussed and implemented at di¤erent paces in di¤erent countries, is not necessarily absorbed by country and period e¤ects.
Shocks
If wages are preset, then shocks as well as politico-economic institutions explain the observed variation of unemployment across countries and over time It is simplest to suppose that as labor demand varies the real wage remains constant, and so does labor force participation along an unchanged supply schedule. As shown in Figure 5 , if the wage is preset at w expecting a = a 0 , then employment deviates from its intended level if in realization a = a 1 6 = a 0 . (Real wages vary if nominal wages are preset and in ‡ation is unexpected, with qualitatively similar implications.)
Combining log l = (log(1 ) + (1 ) log (a) log w) = from (6) and (8), realized unemploy-
Figure 5: Implications of labor demand shocks at given real wage when employment is on labor demand.
varies across countries and periods for two related but distinct reasons. One is that politically determined institutions intentionally steer the wage away from the market-clearing level, as illustrated by (8) and captured by the …rst term on the right-hand side of (9). The other is that, at preset wages, forecast errors move employment away from the level that the politico-economic mechanism would choose after observing realized labor demand. The two mechanisms are related in that wages are naturally preset if they are bargained collectively, and negotiation outcomes giving more weight to labor income than to other income (x < 1 in terms of this simple formal framework) target a positive level of unemployment that may ex post be reduced or increased by labor demand shocks.
7
In terms of empirically observable variables, the identity l d = (wl=y) y=w and u log w log l d yield unemployment u = (1 + ) log w log (wl=y) log y, which deviates from zero if l 6 = log w.
If employment is on a constant-elasticity labor demand, then wl=y = (1 ), and u = (1 + ) log w log (1 ) log y:
7 Wage-setting and other relevant institutions may only slowly adjust to changes in the relevant parameters, such as the and elasticities of this simple model. Learning may then plausibly drive both realized unemployment and institutional variation Philippon 2004, 2006) . Expectational leads and lagged e¤ects are di¢ cult to disentangle in practice, and available data cannot provide even the suggestive support they grant to simpler theoretical mechanisms.
At given w, a constant implies a unitary coe¢ cient for output growth as an explanatory variable of unemployment changes. In the data, that coe¢ cient is much below unity (about one-half in Okun's original statement of his law) and varies considerably across countries and periods (Bertola, 2015) .
One way to accommodate this is to allow the elasticity of labor demand, and the observed labor share, to vary over time. BW's empirical implementation of this idea, outlined and reproduced in the Data Appendix, constructs an empirical counterpart of the second right-hand side term of (9), using the observed labor share to proxy and TFP growth estimates to measure changes of a.
Another way is to relax the assumption that employment is on labor demand, which somewhat implausibly requires employment to adjust faster than wages. If marginal productivity (1 )y=l exceeds the wage by a proportional amount zw in a given time and period, then (1 )y=l = (1 + z) w, and at constant the labor share wl=y = (1 ) = (1 + z) varies if z does. Adjustment costs do insert time-varying wedges between labor's marginal revenue product and wage. When employment is growing the labor share falls short of 1 , because z > 0: marginal productivity equals the current period's wage ‡ow plus the annuity value, along the employers' optimal path, of current hiring costs and expected future …ring costs. Conversely, when employment declines then z < 0 and the observed labor share is larger than the technological elasticity. These e¤ects are more pronounced when variation is perceived to be temporary (as explained for example in Bagliano and Bertola, 2007 , chapter 3).
The BW regressions use the labor share as an indicator of labor demand changes at preset wages, supposing that the parameters governing its relationship to unemployment are constant across observations, or di¤er in ways captured by country e¤ects and institutional indicators. In the original BW sample, the empirical role of labor share changes as determinants of unemployment is correctly signed, statistically signi…cant, and distinct from that of TFP growth (which, in the presence of the wedges denoted by z, does not correspond to changes of the labor demand shifter a, but qualitatively captures the direction and intensity of temporary growth rate ‡uctuations).
In more recent data, however, new sources of variation of adjustment costs and lags may call for di¤erent speci…cations.
Capital and …nancial integration
Labor demand can be shifted by available capital as well as by the productivity or product demand indicator denoted a in the expressions above. Formally, let the production function be ) , and consider a country whose citizens own a stock k of capital, which differs from the domestic stock k d used in production because capital can ‡ow to or from the rest of the world.
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Because capital ‡ows shift labor demand
they shock observed unemployment at given wages. Capital mobility also in ‡uences labor market institutions. Suppose again that policy maximizes the welfare of a decisive agent who earns the per capita labor income and the unit return r = y=k d on a proportion x of the country's national k.
Because domestic capital includes international ‡ows, the income implications of employment for that welfare criterion di¤er from those discussed above for a closed economy (where the x proportion applies to a given stock of non-labor factors of production) through two conceptually di¤erent channels.
First, in a country that experiences capital in ‡ows the decisive agent earns only a portion of domestic capital income, and is less inclined to adopt institutions that imply high employment and high returns to complementary capital. Symmetrically, in a country that exports capital the decisive agent …nds employment-friendly institutions more appealing. Second, not only the level but also the employment elasticity of production depend on whether k d is endogenous. Lower employment decreases the marginal productivity of complementary capital, and if capital can decrease in response then institutions that decrease employment have less favorable implications for capital-poor decisive individuals. 9 This implies that institutions should become more employment-friendly, through a familiar "race-to-the-bottom" e¤ect.
The balance of these e¤ects when comparing …nancial autarky to full …nancial integration depends on countries' sizes and relative capital intensity (Bertola, 2016) . Here, it is useful to outline how less extreme and ongoing changes of …nancial integration may in ‡uence institutionally determined 8 It considerably simpli…es derivations to suppose that there are constant returns to scale and only two factors: mobile capital, and immobile elastically supplied labor. It would be possible but is not necessary for the paper's purposes to account for other immobile factors of production, such as land, or for labor mobility, or for domestic capital accumulation.
9 Formally, the politically decisive agent's income y (l; k d (l)) = ((1 ) + xk=k d (l)) y responds to institutionally determined employment according to
unemployment. Let the productivity of foreign-owned capital in domestic production be scaled by an "iceberg melt" parameter 1.
10 For a country with relatively scarce capital and positive capital in ‡ows, the tighter …nancial integration represented by a larger increases domestic capital and increases labor demand (10). (Similar derivations and symmetric results are valid for a country that experiences capital out ‡ows.) The elasticity of labor demand depends on the country's size at given …nancial integration, as a small country faces a more elastic capital supply, but also depends on …nancial integration: as increases towards unity, employment responds less elastically to the wage.
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The optimality condition for maximization of the non-representative agent's total welfare does not have a closed-form solution for employment, but is easily solved numerically. As shown in Figure 6 , in a capital-poor country the tighter …nancial integration represented by a larger moves the politicoeconomic equilibrium towards lower employment and higher unemployment, for two reasons. The …rst is that the decisive agent becomes capital-poorer relative to the integrated area. The second is that …nancial integration (as modeled) decreases the elasticity of labor demand, and makes it easier for a capital-importing country's workers to appropriate a larger portion of the country's total producer surplus. So while integration tends to imply race-to-the-bottom deregulation, especially in small and capital-rich countries, it need not imply deregulation everywhere, and can plausibly lead to more regulation in capital-poor countries.
The role of interest rates and TFP as an explanatory variable in the BW unemployment regressions is based on a theoretical perspective (Blanchard, 1996) that approximates each country's labor productivity around the steady state of its closed-economy capital accumulation path, and models temporary ‡uctuations (re ‡ecting lagged or costly adjustment) around a perfectly elastic wage-employment relationship. Because international …nance has developed strongly over the last few decades, capital ‡ows may help explain the relatively poor recent performance of that approach.
10 Modeling the degree of integration in technological terms conveniently neglects the budget constraint implications of property rights or repudiation issues. It is possible but tedious to model such wedges on a bilateral basis among many countries, or indeed regions, sectors, and individuals within countries.
11 Formally, when k d = k + for the capital in ‡ow, its marginal productivity (al= (k + ))
(1 ) should under the same functional form assumptions equal (AL= (K ))
( 1 ) if K and AL denote capital and e¤ective labor abroad. Solving for yields the country's domestic capital, k + = k + Kal , and makes it possible to compute the relevant elasticity. 4 Back to the data Section 2's replication exercise …nds that the BW approach does not capture some features of unemployment developments since that paper was written. The updated and extended data set, disciplined by independent de…nitions and earlier use, provides a useful testing ground for Section 3's theoretical thoughts. What follows proposes work-in-progress empirical exercises aimed at detecting reasons why the BW regressions fail to …t recent data, and explores simple modi…cations meant to capture new phenomena and insights.
Unemployment and capital ‡ows
Consider …rst the last of the three thoughts o¤ered in Section 3. The labor market role of capital ‡ows was already apparent when Blanchard (1997, p.130) noted that the medium run labor demand model's predictions could be biased by the assumption "that each economy was on its steady-state growth path [;] if below, an increase in the ratio of capital to labor allows wages to grow faster than TFP without adverse e¤ects on unemployment," and when Blanchard (2006) noted that in countries such as Spain unemployment was declining strongly in the absence of noticeable labor market deregulation or favorable productivity developments. Current account / GDP 1 9 6 0 -1 9 6 4 1 9 6 5 -1 9 6 9 1 9 7 0 -1 9 7 4 1 9 7 5 -1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 -1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 -1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 -1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 - Current account / GDP 1 9 6 0 -1 9 6 4 1 9 6 5 -1 9 6 9 1 9 7 0 -1 9 7 4 1 9 7 5 -1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 -1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 -1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 -1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 - Current account / GDP 1 9 6 0 -1 9 6 4 1 9 6 5 -1 9 6 9 1 9 7 0 -1 9 7 4 1 9 7 5 -1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 -1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 -1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 -1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 -2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 -2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 -2 0 1 4 2 0 1 5 -Current account / GDP Figure 7 : Current account / GDP ratios over 5-year periods (source: AMECO). Thick lines plot unweighted averages.
Financial integration lets international capital ‡ows in ‡uence labor markets more strongly, and much more suddenly, than closed-economy capital accumulation dynamics. 12 The relative capital scarcity of countries need not be related to their position relative to their own conditional steady state, and slow savings-driven dynamics can be dwarfed by quick capital movements, as was the case in the initial phase of Europe's Economic and Monetary Union (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2002) .
The BW shock series may therefore fail to capture country-speci…c phenomena that only became relevant as …nancial internationalization made it easier for capital to move internationally, and crises triggered large …nancial ‡ows. Figure 7 shows that current account / GDP ratios began around 1990 to ‡uctuate widely, and more asymmetrically than the BW shocks. This pattern was plausibly driven by easier international mobility of capital, and is a plausible driver of labor market conditions: domestic investment increases demand for complementary labor, and consumption-smoothing borrowing by previously liquidityconstrained countries has a similarly positive labor demand e¤ect in their economies'non-tradable sectors.
If asymmetric current account developments are signi…cantly related to unemployment, then labor market shocks are poorly represented by common period dummies. One way to assess the labor market relevance of …nancial integration is to control for its empirical manifestation in unemployment regressions. Inserting current account / GDP ratios in the BW ‡agship regressions that in Tables 4 and 5 recently cease to estimate sensible coe¢ cients, Tables 7 and 8 …nd that they are insigni…cant in column 1's original BW sample, but positively and strongly associated with unemployment in column 2 (which includes the more recent data) and column 3 (which drops the earliest third of the time periods).
The positive covariation of current account surpluses and unemployment rates is qualitatively consistent with the role of capital ‡ows as a shock to labor demand. The regression captures a causal relationship if capital ‡ows are driven by changing …nancial integration of the type represented by in the previous section, and have the labor demand implications shown in expression (10). In theory, however, international capital mobility in ‡uences unemployment not only directly (associating de…cits to higher employment at given institutions) but also through institutional reforms (which partly o¤set that e¤ect, and tend to decrease employment in de…cit countries). Moreover, current accounts may be driven by heterogeneous productivity growth expectations and saving rates that also directly in ‡uence labor market outcomes.
Comparing Figures 3 and 8 , the shocks of Table 8 do not predict unemployment changes much better than those of Table 5 . It is also apparent that including the current account in the linear combination of shocks yields a regression fails to account for something that strongly and rather uniformly increased unemployment in Australia, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain in the run-up to the Great Depression. Interestingly, however, in regressions that control for current accounts the coe¢ cient of TFP growth is insigni…cant (rather than strongly signi…cant but wrongly signed), and so is the labor share-based demand shock. In line with Section 3's perspective, tighter …nancial integration does appear to imply that current accounts capture labor market conditions better than indicators meant to measure closed-economy mechanisms.
Capital ‡ows and reforms
Theory also suggests that exogenously more intense capital ‡ows should be relevant to labor market institutions. For a capital-importing country, the politico-economic optimal employment is lower (relative to the higher laissez-faire level implied by capital in ‡ows) in more integrated …nancial market; conversely, capital-exporting countries not only experience lower labor demand, but also have stronger incentives to deregulate their labor markets. This mechanism, illustrated in Figure 6 , can explain the divergent reforms of European core and periphery countries (Bertola, 2016) .
Anticipations and lags make it di¢ cult to disentangle labor demand and reform e¤ects in the data. Seeking suggestive evidence Table 9 asks the updated BW dataset whether labor market deregulation is associated with current account surpluses. The answer is a quali…ed "yes". Columns 1 and 2 regress 5-period changes of labor tax wedges and unemployment replacement rates on 5-year average current account/GDP ratios, with country and period …xed e¤ects (the coe¢ cients estimated without …xed e¤ects are similar in sign and signi…cance). Signi…cantly negative coe¢ cients detect a tendency for de…cit countries to regulate their labor markets more stringently, and support to the idea that, given other political and structural factors, easier capital mobility associates current account surpluses with labor market deregulation when, as in Section 3's models, distributional motives shape labor market institutions.
The estimated relationships could be spuriously driven by unobservable factors, such as political shifts that trigger labor market deregulation and improve competitiveness. The regressions in columns 3 and 4 of Table 9 attempt to isolate the role of …nancial integration instrumenting the current account with indicators of gross …nancial integration (Broner and others., 2013) and dummies indicating adoption of the euro by 10 countries, starting in the 2000-04 period (without accounting for the …nancial integration impact of the subsequent crises). These instruments are meant to amplify the portion of current account variation that re ‡ects easier international investment. They cannot disentangle the e¤ects of positive and negative capital ‡ows, however, and their exclusion from the second stage may be invalid if political factors drive both labor market reforms and international …nancial deregulation. The estimated slope coe¢ cients are negative, consistently with Section 3's simple model. But the instruments are weak, and the coe¢ cients are statistically signi…cant only when …xed e¤ects are omitted and only for the labor tax wedge (which may suggest that the portion of current account variation due to …nancial integration is more relevant to government budgets than to labor market deregulation). These data and simple theory do not disagree with each other: all slope coe¢ cients have the expected positive sign when they are signi…cant. Insigni…cance of employment protection is not theoretically surprising because higher turnover costs reduce both unemployment in ‡ows and out ‡ows, and have small and ambiguous average e¤ects. Labor taxation should (all else equal) reduce both labor supply and labor demand without increasing unemployment, but its signi…cantly positive coef…cient suggests that large tax wedges are positively correlated with institutional constraints on wage ‡exibility. Time-varying union density might in principle capture some of those factors. In practice, its insigni…cant coe¢ cient in column 1 suggests that it poorly captures the relevant institutional features, which may be more appropriately (but also more imprecisely and subjectively) measured by "coverage" and "coordination" indices. All three BW shocks are signi…cant and correctly signed in column 1, but only the real interest rate is robust to controlling for period e¤ects in column 2: the empirical time variation of TFP growth and labor shares is empirically hard to distinguish from that of other unobservable unemployment determinants, and the same is the case for unemployment insurance generosity. Columns 3 and 4 include the current account to GDP ratio, which is positive but insigni…cant when period e¤ects are included; controlling for the variation captured by period e¤ects or the current account yields a positive and signi…cant coe¢ cient estimate for union density.
Unemployment, shocks, and institutions
A causal interpretation of these regressions is only warranted if time-variation of institutions (and shocks) is driven by exogenous political and economic factors. In accounting terms, excluding institutions would lower the R 2 of the regressions in Table 10 by about 0.05 (without period e¤ects) or 0.03 (with period e¤ects); excluding shocks instead, the R 2 declines by 0.12 or 0.04, respectively.
Along with the broadly sensible pattern of coe¢ cients, this suggest that over the longer time span of the extended sample unemployment variation is explained by institutions directly and not just by their interaction with shocks. Theoretically plausible interactions may also be empirically relevant, however. A moderate dose of theory-inspired speci…cation searching allows regressions to detect some sensible patterns believably (at least for readers who have seen other country-panel regressions and endured this paper so far). As discussed in Section 3.2, for example, the strength of the empirical relationship between unemployment and the labor-share-based indicator of the size and direction of labor demand shocks depends on a variety of technological and institutional factors, of which one is at least imprecisely observable and of policy interest: in countries and periods where employment protection is more stringent, not only wages but also and especially employment react sluggishly to shocks. Hence, the labor share can ‡uctuate widely without much employment variation, and unemployment should be less sensitive to variation of the BW labor demand shocks. Aiming to detect this in the data, the regressions of Table 11 include the real rate and current account/GDP, the more signi…cant and robust shocks in Table 10 , along with the …rst di¤erence rather than the level of the labor demand shock, its interaction with time-varying employment protection, other time-varying institutions, and country …xed e¤ects. The interaction term is estimated to be negative, in line with theoretical expectations, and signi…cantly so when the regressions control for lagged unemployment. The large and very signi…cant coe¢ cient of the lagged dependent variable might call for further re…nements.
These could doubtlessly yield results that adhere more closely to theoretical expectations, but would be di¢ cult to compare to the BW results.
Concluding comments
Macroeconomists "had entered the 1970s without a model of the natural rate, and had not anticipated stag ‡ation"and around the turn of the millennium found it fruitful to explain unemployment with "adverse shocks interacting with country-speci…c collective bargaining structures" (Blanchard, 2006) . In recent experience that approach does not work as well as it used to, possibly as a consequence of institutional reforms. These may perhaps have been triggered by persuasive research results, but the politico-economic mechanisms that jointly shape unemployment and policies are only beginning to be understood. This paper's theoretical thoughts suggest that unemployment can be a natural side e¤ect of institutions meant to redistribute welfare across individuals. Its empirical results indicate that macroeconomic shocks, institutional change, and international integration account for a large portion of unemployment's variation. The most robust and policy-relevant empirical driver of unemployment is the real interest rate, driven in turn not only by exogenous shocks but also by …scal and monetary policies. In theory, integration of capital markets plays a role both as a shock determining unemployment at given institutions, and as a driver of institutional change. In the data, the changing intensity of capital ‡ows helps empirically to identify some determinants of unemployment and of labor market institutions.
Macroeconomic empirical evidence can at most be suggestive. Still, the paper's perspective and …ndings can be informative for those who need to formulate and express policy advice. All institutions and policies have pros and cons, and these di¤er not only across countries and over time (Blanchard, Jaumotte and Loungani, 2014) but also across individuals. It would be strange if economists knew better about institutions than policy-makers and than the citizens who elect them. It is equally implausible to presume that the observed policy is always and unambiguously the most appropriate one. In an imperfect world, labor policy has distributional as well as e¢ ciencyoriented objectives. Thus, its appeal is a politically charged subject, and its con…guration depends on the decisive political coalition's objectives as well as on the conditions in which it is implemented.
Research economists can plausibly claim to have better information than the public about the varying intensity of institutions' pros and cons. When recommending and studying reforms, however, we should be aware of their distributional motivation and e¤ects, and recognize that whether institutions should or do change depends importantly on the conditions in which policy choices are made.
Data appendix
The BW dataset covered 8 time periods, 1960-4 to 1990-4, and 1995+ (typically 1995-6) , for 20 OECD countries. The BW data, a sample program, and an appendix outlining data de…nitions are available at http://web.mit.edu/blanchar/www/articles.html . The BW macroeconomic data were drawn from the OECD Quarterly Business Sector Database (BSDB) diskette, which was discontinued soon afterwards. A …le found at http://fmwww.bc.edu/ec-p/data/oecd/bsdb.dta makes it possible to check whether the BW indicator construction and time aggregation was performed correctly (it was, on a somewhat di¤erent release of the data).
The Annual Macroeconomic (AMECO) database maintained by the European Commission's Economics and Finance Directorate General, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_…nance/db_indicators/ameco/index_en.htm , includes on a consistently de…ned basis and since the early 1960s the variables needed to update the BW shock indicators (this version of the present paper uses the February 2016 AMECO update). For the pre-uni…cation period a "linked Germany"observation is often available, otherwise data for West Germany are used here. For a few non-EU countries some data are missing in AMECO. As noted below, they are replaced by the BW observation or reconstructed from OECD data. coe¢ cients to predict the indicators results in series that are always driven by the most recent data and weigh them in a way meant to replicate and extend the BW variables. The resulting series is not as precisely de…ned as the ready-made series available for shorter periods in AMECO and/or in the BSDB, but these and especially the latter do not always appear as believable as one would like in the …gures below.
Shocks
The real interest rate is from AMECO, where it is not available for Australia and New Zealand: for these countries the long-term interest rates available from the OECD from 1970 is de ‡ated with the yearly log growth of the AMECO GDP de ‡ator.
